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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the early 1970s Britain was swept by a wave of militant industrial struggle, the 
depth and political character of which was unprecedented since the 1920s, both 
in terms of the sheer scale of strike activity involved and because it witnessed 
some of the most dramatic confrontations between unions and government in 
postwar Britain.  One of the most notable high points of struggle was the 1972 
miners’ strike for higher wages, which delivered the miners their ‘greatest victory’ 
(Hall, 1981) and inflicted a devastating defeat on the Conservative government 
headed by Edward Heath. The strike, with its mass pickets, provided a vivid 
illustration of the power and confidence of shopfloor union organization that had 
been built up in the post-war period (Darlington and Lyddon, 2001; Lyddon and 
Darlington, 2003). Although the miners won another victory in 1974, culminating 
in a general election that brought down the Heath government, this strike was 
altogether a much more passive dispute compared with 1972, with a tight control 
on picketing under TUC-supported guidelines of only six pickets imposed by the 
NUM executive.  
 
A much more marked contrast occurred with the 1984-5 miners’ strike, 
which took place against the backcloth of a deep economic recession, an 
avalanche of redundancies and closures, and a neo-liberal Conservative 
government headed by Margaret Thatcher that displayed its resolve to fight with 
and beat any trade-union (the ‘enemy within’) that sought to challenge its 
authority. During ‘84-5, in what was to be the longest national dispute in post-war 
Britain, the government inflicted a bitter defeat on the miners (albeit not as great 
as in the 1926 General Strike) in a battle over pit closures and redundancies. The 
outcome of the strike both symbolized the rapidly changing shift in the balance of 
power away from workers towards employers and greatly accelerated this 
process across the trade-union movement as a whole in the years that followed. 
 
This article aims to reassess the defeat of the miners’ strike of ‘84-5 by 
comparing it with the victory of ’72. In the process it aims to critically evaluate the 
predominant argument accepted by most commentators, both hostile and 
sympathetic to the miners’ struggles, that the 1984-5 strike was a heroic but 
inevitably doomed stand against the juggernaut of a Thatcher government 
determined to use unlimited resources to avenge its defeats of a decade or more 
earlier, in which the miners’ militant tactics merely contributed to the scale of their 
defeat (Goodman, 1985; Wilsher et al, 1985; Adeney and Lloyd, 1986; 
Routledge, 1993). 
 
For example, Robert Taylor in The Trade Union Question in British Politics 
(1993: 292:298) argues Scargill was an ‘industrial Napoleon’ who called a strike 
‘at the wrong time’ on the ‘wrong issue’ and adopted strategy and tactics that 
were ‘impossibilist’, with ‘an inflexible list of extravagant non-negotiable 
demands’ that amounted to ‘reckless adventurism’ which was ‘a dangerous, self-
defeating delusion’. A similar historical assessment, albeit sometimes less 
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vitriolic, has been made by many others, with Goodman (1985: 48) expressing 
the widely shared perception that central to the failure of the strike was the 
crucial tactical error of substituting the flying picket for the holding of a national 
ballot. It was this ‘error of judgement’ that alienated the majority of 
Nottinghamshire miners, weakened the NUM’s position with the rest of the trade-
union movement, undermined the miners’ cause with public opinion, and 
inevitably opened the door to picket-line violence which in turn strengthened the 
hand of the Coal Board, government and media. Ironically, as George Bolton, 
vice-president of the Scottish NUM and chairman of the Communist Party, 
commented, reflecting the party’s subsequent public rejection of ‘Scargillism’: 
‘you can’t picket your way to victory’ (Marxism Today, September 1984). Such a 
strategy, others have argued, meant a brave and heroic resistance movement 
was arrogantly and recklessly led to ‘loss without limit’ (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986). 
 
This article presents an alternative explanation for the 84-5 defeat. It 
argues that it was actually the failure to replicate to the same extent the militant 
tactics of mass and flying pickets to stop the movement of coal that had been so 
dramatically adopted during the 1972 strike, combined with the relative lack of 
solidarity industrial action from other trade-unionists compared with the earlier 
dispute, which was crucial.  
 
. 
 
THE 1972 STRIKE 
 
Some of the key features of the audacity and militancy of the ’72 miners strike 
that explain its success were (1) effective picketing; (2) extent of solidarity action;  
and 3) strength of rank-and-file organization and left-wing networks. 
 
(1) effective picketing 
 
Whilst traditions of secondary picketing in Yorkshire had been extended to some 
other mining areas in the 1969 and 1970 unofficial strikes, the ’72 strike saw it 
raised to an altogether different plane. In practice, the mass and/or flying picket 
became the key tactical weapon that was to prove devastatingly effective and 
often in defiance of the national union leadership (Darlington and Lyddon, 2001: 
38-50). Despite official NUM instructions to their members to maintain safety 
work and allow pit deputies (members of the union NACODS) to do likewise, 
there was remarkable widespread unofficial action in many different areas of the 
country to deprive pits of NUM safety cover, combined with the use of mass 
pickets several hundred strong, to prevent the deputies carrying out their work. 
Similarly, union instructions to permit the union’s white collar section (COSA) to 
continue working normally were defied with successful unofficial mass picketing 
across the country, which was then extended to National Coal Board (NCB) 
employees in the Clerical and Administrative Workers Union who did not join the 
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strike at the large Coal House offices in Doncaster (and in south-Wales and the 
north-east).  
Even more significantly, from the onset of the strike miners in many areas 
started picketing other sites away from their collieries, with the union’s national 
office only issuing official instructions along these lines a few days into the 
dispute. Firstly, there was a move to stop the general movement of coal by dock, 
rail, and road transport workers, and its use by power workers - with different 
NUM areas allocated responsibility for picketing coal stock yards, open cast 
mines, docks and power stations in different non-mining regions of the country. 
For example, the Barnsley Panel of the Yorkshire miners was given East Anglia 
to picket. When the tactic of spreading pickets thinly over too many locations (15 
ports and 7 power stations) failed, Arthur Scargill (1975) successfully pushed for 
mass picketing to be organized at each site in turn. Secondly, there was 
picketing to stop the movement of other essential materials – namely oil into oil-
fired power stations and the materials needed to make serviceable and ignite the 
coal in power stations (such as caustic soda, hydrogen, sulphuric acid, 
lubricating oil, and other chemicals). A dramatic example of this type of mass 
picketing occurred at the Coalite Smokeless Fuel plant in Grimethorpe, near 
Barnsley (Crick, 1985: 53-54). 
 
In all of the above cases picketing was carried out despite repeated violent 
confrontations with the police, often involving arrests - notably at the mass picket 
and blockade of Longannet power station in Scotland (Wallington, 1972), and 
was characterized by its mass participation - with Vic Allen (1981: 200) 
estimating an average of 40,000 pickets each day. Whilst this is probably an 
overestimate, there is no doubt such activity involved a very high proportion of 
the 308,000 strikers and probably dwarfed that of any other large strike. 
Crucially, ‘the spirit of aggression and zeal displayed by rank-and-file miners’ 
(Taylor, 1980: 367), exemplified by the use of flying and mass pickets, was so 
successful that it eventually led the government to declare a state of emergency 
in order to ration electricity supplies, leading to power cuts and the lay-off of 1.6 
million workers. Margaret Thatcher’s subsequent reflections (1995: 216) confirm 
the shock the strike was to give the Conservative government, forcing it to 
capitulate shortly afterwards: ‘The possibility of effective mass picketing which 
could prevent oil and coal getting to power stations, was simply not on the 
agenda’. 
 
 
(2) extent of solidarity action 
 
A second feature of the ’72 miners’ strike was the extent of practical solidarity 
action displayed (both official and unofficial) of other workers, action which the 
miners’ pickets themselves directly encouraged but without which their strike 
could never have been so effective.  
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Such solidarity was expressed in numerous ways, most notably in the 
observance of TUC General Council guidelines issued on the second day of the 
strike asking trade-unionists to respect NUM picket lines, albeit this only applied 
to the movement of coal (TUC Annual Report, 1972: 97-8). Rank-and-file 
transport and railway union members quickly respected picket lines (which often 
had to be maintained 24 hours a day) and sometimes went much further than 
official union guidelines. Dockers boycotted ships carrying imported coal for 
power stations, and train drivers boycotted all movement of coal by rail, with 
ASLEF responding to local initiatives by calling on members not to take oil into 
power stations where there were picket lines. However, the national decisions of 
the railway and transport workers’ unions to respect the miners’ picket lines did 
not mean that all movement of coal magically halted. For example, road haulage 
drivers - who might be threatened with disciplinary action or even dismissal by 
their employers – often required robust picketing and face-to-face argument to be 
persuaded (although non-union drivers, often with police escorts, remained a 
continuing problem). One of the most remarkable examples of solidarity was 
when an NUM banner draped across an overhead railway bridge by two flying 
pickets caused the drivers of a goods train of oil tankers to stop in their tracks 
and refuse to cross (Times, 2 August 1972).  
 
The most affected organization was the Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB) which reported that it was ‘in a state of siege’, complained of the 
‘unrelenting blockade’ of power stations, and considered itself to be ‘conducting a 
guerilla war’. The pickets’ stranglehold on the supply of oil and essential gases to 
power stations was critical and accelerated the impact of the immobilization of 
coal supplies (The Times, 2, 5, 15 February 1972). 
 
The solidarity displayed at Saltley, and the willingness and ability of other 
trade-unionists across the country – such as dockers, power workers, lorry 
drivers, and railway workers – to take action in support of the miners generally, 
clearly reflected the self-confidence and strength of shop stewards’ organization 
that had been built up in the proceeding years, and was a reflection of the high 
level of working class struggle, the offensive nature of many strikes, and the way 
in which the initiative was increasingly coming from the shopfloor level rather 
than national union leaderships during this period. 
 
 
 (3) strength of rank-and-file organization and left-wing networks 
 
Also important was the strength of rank-and-file organization and left-wing 
networks amongst the miners. Established in the late 1960s the Barnsley Miners 
Forum (whose most prominent figure was Scargill) had grouped militant activists 
in Yorkshire together and already successfully contested the activities of the 
right-wing official union leadership at local and national level, both through the 
union structure and by taking the lead in the use of flying pickets during the 
unofficial ’69 and ’70 strikes. A National Miners’ Forum drew together left-wing 
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activists and full-time officials from Yorkshire, Scotland, Kent and Derbyshire 
(Allen, 1981; Taylor, 1984; Crick, 1985; Routledge, 1993). Even though, like 
other broad left organizations of the time, they were concerned with 
electioneering against right-wing area and national NUM leaders (successfully 
securing the election of ex-Communist Party member Lawrence Daly as NUM 
general secretary), they were also ideally placed to provide a militant focus for 
rank-and-file bitterness over wages. 
 
As a result, although the president of the NUM (Joe Gormley) during the 
’72 strike was a right-winger, and the NUM executive had a narrow right-majority, 
it was to be the confidence and organization of the rank-and-file, who often went 
well beyond official union guidelines, that set the pace and direction of the strike. 
Sometimes national and area NUM full-time officials were pulled along by rank-
and-file initiatives. On other occasions the national, and often the area, union 
officials were clearly against the decisions taken by miners but were unable to 
enforce their policy or to use sanctions against the members. 
 
It is also of major significance that whilst the miners received support from 
the official trade-union movement, they were never subservient to the TUC 
general council and were able to dictate their own fate. The NUM was able to 
escalate the strike outside the normal constraints of Congress House, unlike in 
1926. The miners’ ‘understanding of their own history…resulted in the TUC being 
excluded from all negotiations’ (Francis and Smith, 1980: 476). 
 
In addition, a very important role was played by a network of left-wing 
political activists, in particular those grouped around the Communist Party, but 
including other left-wing Labour Party and non-aligned militants. This was evident 
inside the NUM - within the miners’ forums and on the NUM national executive 
(notably through the figure of Scottish NUM president Mick McGahey) – with 
several years of campaigning by the left within all levels of the union successfully 
building the necessary strike majority in the first place. It was also evident in 
terms of the solidarity the miners received from other trade-unionists, notably the 
supply of information, contacts, financial support, and the extent of blacking and 
strike action. For example, at Saltley, two Communist Party members, Frank 
Watters (Birmingham district party secretary) and Arthur Harper (chair of the 
AUEW East Birmingham district committee and convener at the BL Tractors and 
Transmissions Plant) were instrumental in winning support for strike action, as 
were the 800 other party members in the city many of whom were leading 
convenors and stewards in local factories (Watters, 1992; Darlington and 
Lyddon, 2001). 
 
 
THE 1984-5 STRIKE 
 
The 1984-5 miners’ strike was completely different from 1972 in many respects. 
Of course, there were some similar features – such as the rank-and-file initiative, 
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mass and flying pickets, defiance of the law, violent confrontations with police, 
solidarity from other trade-unionists, and the way the Labour Party (at least its 
organization and leadership in general as opposed to the activities of many 
individual members) was fairly irrelevant, and whilst formally sympathetic 
retained deep reservations about the tactics used.  
 
But there were also important differences compared to ‘72. Clearly, as we 
shall see below, the miners faced a quite different type of political opponent in ‘84 
that had a critical vested interest in breaking them, combined with a formidable 
array of weapons with which to do so. Similarly, the economic context was quite 
different, with the fear of unemployment generally during the early 1980s 
contrasting with the relatively much more favourable environment of the early 
1970s, as further reflected in the different level and character of workers’ struggle 
within the two periods. In addition, the unity achieved by the miners in ‘72 (and 
‘74) proved difficult to preserve in ‘84-5. The national wages parity (introduced by 
the 1966 National Power Loading Agreement), which had underpinned strike 
action in the early 1970s, was effectively destroyed in 1978 by the reintroduction 
of incentive payments into the industry. Meanwhile, the uneven impact of the pit 
closure programme adopted by the Coal Board after the election of the Thatcher 
government in 1979, made it an inherently divisive issue on which to build a 
united front across the various coalfields. Nonetheless, it should be noted despite 
such problems, 80 per cent of miners nationally (although only a small minority in 
Nottingham) were on strike by April 1984, including many of those in no 
immediate danger of job loss, reflecting the degree of unity that was achieved.  
 
Also different from ’72 was the way the NUM national leadership rather 
than proceeding to national strike action under a ballot as provided for in the 
union constitution’s rule 43, responded to the strikes already underway in 
Yorkshire and Scotland (not all of which were directly related to the issue of pit 
closures) and the activities of picketing miners, to endorse and to extend 
approval to any other coalfield joining the strike under rule 41. This spread the 
strike on a ‘rolling’ basis in what union vice-president McGahey termed a ‘domino 
effect’ (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986: 169). 
 
But clearly the main difference with ’72 is that the miners suffered a major 
defeat in ‘84-5. The key question is whether, as many commentators have 
claimed, against the backcloth of a trailblazing neo-liberal Thatcher government, 
defeat was inevitable, and the NUM’s militant tactics adopted during the strike 
were self-defeating? 
 
Arguably, some of the central features of the 84-5 strike that explain its 
defeat were the (1) scale of government and state offensive; (2) inadequate 
picketing; (3) weakness of rank-and-file organization and left-wing networks; (4) 
and limited solidarity action. By exploring each of these components, and taking 
into consideration some other broader features, it is possible to make some 
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comparisons with ’72, in the process considering potential alternative courses of 
action. 
 
 
(1) scale of government and state offensive 
 
To begin with there was the sheer scale of the offensive mounted by the 
government and the state, not seen since 1926 and on a qualitatively different 
level to that experienced in ’72 (Coulter, Miller and Walker, 1984; Beynon, 1985; 
Geary, 1985; Reed and Adamson, 1985; Samuel, Bloomfield and Bonas, 1986; 
Green, 1990; Milne, 2004). Although the 84-5 strike was about pit closures and 
job losses, it was also a central battle in the Conservative government’s attempts 
to transform society along the path of neo-liberalism and to crush working class 
resistance. Margaret Thatcher saw the NUM – and Scargill in particular – as the 
embodiment of all that she held to be endemic in Britain’s economic decline: 
monopoly trade-unionism is a state industry subsidized well beyond the point of 
efficient market forces. She saw the political need to defeat the NUM – the 
‘Coldstream Guards of organized labour’ if she was to cow the trade-union 
movement in general (Goodman, 1985: 17). And, no doubt, Thatcher was 
motivated by a need for revenge for the setbacks of the early 1970s. 
 
In accordance with the Ridley Report (Economist, 27 May 1978), the 
government had in a preemptive move arranged for the building up of coal stocks 
at power stations, made preparations to import foreign coal, recruited non-union 
lorry drivers to convoy coal to the power stations, and switched from coal to oil 
firing to save coal stocks. The government also appointed Ian MacGregor as 
chairman of the Coal Board to spearhead the new management offensive. And 
with the onset of the strike it was prepared to use unlimited resources and the full 
wrath of the state against the miners. 
 
Despite systematic denials of government intervention in public-sector 
negotiations, the Thatcher government directed contingency operations 
throughout, effectively shaping the activities of the NCB, CEGB, and British Rail. 
And following the creation of a National Reporting Centre to centralize Britain’s 
regional police forces at a national level (Bunyan, 1985), the government 
mobilized the police in a highly coordinated military-style offensive against the 
miners, designed to isolate the Nottinghamshire area and break picket lines 
elsewhere, for example using mounted police with truncheons to charge down 
pickets at Orgreave. They occupied mining villages, arrested 11,312 people and 
tried 5,653 in the courts for alleged offences (most of them miners), casting aside 
notions of civil liberties (Percy-Smith and Hillyard, 1985: 345). David Hart, a 
wealthy property developer with close connections with Thatcher’s team of 
advisers at 10 Downing Street, played a significant role in helping to organize a 
National Working Miners’ Committee. At the same time new laws imposing 
punitive deductions from benefits rights for strikers’ families were implemented. 
The courts were also a weapon in the war against the miners, with injunctions 
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banning them from picket lines and judges declaring the strike illegal, ordering 
the seizure of union funds, and in the end trying to take over the whole miners’ 
union. Finally, the NUM was subject to a intensive ideological offensive by the 
media, notably in a campaign for a national ballot aimed at breaking the 
momentum of the dispute. 
 
However, arguably this formidable barrage from the government, state 
and media did not itself break the resolve of the miners or their supporters. Whilst 
it certainly made the task of effective picketing (both within and outside the 
coalfields) considerably more difficult it was not entirely responsible for the 
relative weaknesses of the strike’s impact and the lack of solidarity action 
displayed by other trade-unionists compared with ‘72. There were also other 
factors we need to take into account. 
 
(2) inadequate picketing  
 
The 1984-5 miners’ strike was characterized by widespread picketing 
aimed at making the strike bite, and involved much more violent confrontations 
with the police than in ’72. But of crucial significance to the defeat of the strike 
was the fact that the successful tactics adopted twelve years earlier - namely the 
concentration of flying and/or mass pickets at power stations, docks and coal 
depots until the movement of coal and other materials was blocked at each site - 
were not replicated to the same extent. Instead, such picket lines where they 
were established (and there were far fewer than expected) were generally 
sporadic, desultory and often ignored (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986:108-111; 
Winterton and Winterton, 1989: 96-99; Richards, 1996:127-127). 
 
As we have already noted, the relative ineffectiveness of the picketing in 
‘84-5 is to be explained partly by the deliberately obstructionist intervention of the 
police. In addition, although rank-and-file miners attempted to take the initiative 
by spreading the strike in an offensive fashion to win support from other workers, 
for example at Didcot power station in Oxfordshire, much of the picketing was 
necessarily forced onto the defensive back into the coalfields in order to attempt 
to halt the back-to-work moves in Nottingham and elsewhere. But probably the 
most important reason why the miners’ successful picketing tactics of ’72 were 
not replicated was because of the lack of central direction or co-ordination to 
activists on the ground provided by area NUM officials (Callinicos and Simons, 
1985). Four examples illustrate the point: 
 
• Nottingham: there was the denunciation of the Yorkshire flying pickets that 
converged on Nottingham in the first days of the strike by Notts area NUM 
officials, the refusal of left-wing Notts area secretary Henry Richardson to 
publicly dispute miners’ ‘right to work’ (despite appeals not to cross picket 
lines), and the public disavowal of the unofficial pickets and instruction for 
them to be withdrawn for two weeks made by Yorkshire area NUM officials so 
to allow a Notts area ballot to take place. It is possible that if, from the onset 
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of the strike and before the huge subsequent police operation that was 
mounted, striking miners had been provided the opportunity to explain their 
case face-to-face to working miners with the aim of trying to bring the pits out, 
the division that developed between Nottingham and the rest of the coalfields 
would not have been so fatal. Certainly, this tactic operated successfully in 
South Wales where the sanctity of the picket line proved crucial in 
overcoming the result of individual pithead ballots that had initially recorded 
opposition to strike action at eighteen of the area’s twenty-eight NUM lodges 
(Richards, 1996: 100). 
 
 
Ironically, notwithstanding the assumption that the NUM’s failure to organize a 
national ballot was a ‘tactical mistake’ that inevitably undermined miners’ 
unity, and that a vote could actually have been won (a viewpoint held even by 
left-wing commentators such as Beynon, 1985: 7), it seems likely that had a 
ballot been implemented it would merely have invited a ‘no’ vote and derailed 
the entire momentum of the strike movement. A number of crucial arguments 
influenced the decision against holding one, including: the failure to obtain a 
majority for action in earlier ballots in 1982 and 1983; the considerable initial 
success which pickets had in spreading the strike suggesting their objectives 
could be achieved without recourse to a ballot; the supporters of a ballot were 
generally opposed to the strike and knew the media would mount an 
unprecedented ‘vote no’ campaign, which meant there was no guarantee that 
Notts miners would have joined a strike that the area voted against, even if a 
national ballot had been held and a majority attained overall; pit closures were 
a divisive issue with no person having the right to vote another out of a job 
(Winterton and Winterton, 1989: 70-71). Although a ballot is unlikely to have 
secured a favourable majority in Nottinghamshire, it does seem reasonable to 
suggest that an active picketing strategy backed up with a propaganda 
offensive from the outset of the strike might have won a much larger network 
of support in the area, thereby considerably diminishing the damage to the 
strike that transpired.  
  
• Power Stations: there was the discarding of power stations (the Coal Board’s 
single biggest customer) as an unrealistic target by many area NUM officials 
‘despite anguished criticism from many rank-and-file strikers’ (Sunday Times 
Insight Team, 1985: 84). In ’72 success had been based on denying coal to 
power stations. With no fresh coal being mined, it had been relatively easy to 
ask power workers not to accept it. This time, with substantial supplies of coal 
being delivered from working pits, there was all the more reason to contact 
power workers. In Yorkshire there was no effort made to move coal into 
power stations, but there would have been a case for attempting to stop some 
of the other chemical supplies necessary for operations. This had been a 
crucial factor in ’72, since when the electricity board had built up much larger 
supplies and storage facilities, but they were not shortage-proof, as initial 
picketing by South Wales miners at the Didcot power station (albeit not 
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sustained) demonstrated. Equally, picketing could have impacted to hamper 
or even halt operations at oil-fired power stations, as briefly occurred at West 
Thurrock in Sussex (Adeney and Lloyd, 1986: 147-153).  
 
 
• Steel: there was the granting of local ‘dispensations’ by NUM area officials in 
Scotland, Yorkshire and South Wales to the ISTC steel union aimed at 
allowing sufficient supplies of coal through to keep the furnaces alight and to 
avert the threat of any steel plant closure by the British Steel Corporation 
(BSC). This decision subsequently enabled BSC (the Coal Board’s second 
biggest customer) to utilize coal supplies, which it had claimed to be only for 
maintenance, to substantially restore full production levels. Again, it is 
possible that had a determined appeal been made to rank-and-file steel 
workers from the outset to defy such threats and support the miners, 
combined with the mobilization of mass pickets by miners aimed at halting the 
delivery of coal into the steel plants, the impact of the strike might have been 
much greater, particularly if the car and engineering sectors had, as a result, 
been starved of their essential supplies. Despite the hostile stance of ISTC 
union leader Bill Sirs there was widespread sympathy for the miners, 
reinforced by the support they had received from the NUM in their own recent 
national strike that could have been tapped. In the event, an attempt by the 
NUM’s national leadership to order a halt to supplies to the steel plants, 
following mounting grassroots criticism of the local ‘sweetheart deals’, led to 
belated and poorly coordinated area union attempts to mount token 
blockades. But such moves, after BSC increasingly turned to road transport to 
get the (increased rate of) ore in and steel out, for example at Ravenscraig in 
Scotland and Llanwern in South Wales, proved fruitless. 
 
• Orgreave: there was the refusal of NUM area officials (above all Jack Taylor, 
Yorkshire NUM president) and the union’s national executive to mount mass 
picketing aimed at turning ‘Orgreave into Saltley’, notwithstanding NUM 
president Arthur Scargill’s determined personal efforts to encourage such a 
repeat of the ’72 victory. Although thousands of rank-and-file miners did take 
the initiative from below to converge onto the coking plant (which supplied the 
Scunthorpe steel plant), area union officials refused to call mass pickets for 
more than two consecutive days and rejected the attempt to build a consistent 
and prolonged mobilization of mass pickets, or to appeal for solidarity strike 
action or picket line support from the large concentrations of engineering and 
steelworkers based in nearby Sheffield and Rotherham, as was advocated by 
at least a small core of militant activists in the Yorkshire area (Winterton and 
Winterton, 1989: 100). Again, it is possible that the adoption of such 
alternative tactics might have galvanized sufficient numbers (of hitherto more 
passive strikers as well as sympathetic local trade-unionists) to overcome the 
determination of the state to defeat mass picketing to successfully shut the 
plant down, which could have marked a symbolic political and psychological 
(albeit not necessarily industrial) turning point in the strike in a similar fashion 
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to Saltley. This in turn could have boosted the impetus to spread picketing out 
to other vulnerable areas. Instead, the uneven series of mass pickets that 
were held were unable to prevent the thousands of police officers equipped 
with riot helmets, shields, truncheons and horses at their flanks, inflicting 
some of the greatest violence seen in an industrial dispute since before the 
First World War. 
 
In all of these four examples an explicit tactical decision to act in a certain 
way, and not adopt the alternative approach favoured by the most militant 
sections of miners, was made by area NUM leaders. In the process each 
example illustrates the way the tactics adopted during the 84-5 strike were 
indeed self-defeating to some extent - but for entirely opposite reasons than 
those most commentators who have criticized ‘Scargillite’ militant trade-unionism 
have argued. As Scargill himself commented after NUM area officials had 
signalled an end to picketing at Orgreave: ‘Some people say that the problem 
was a failure of mass picketing, but I say it was a failure to mass picket’ (Simons, 
2004: 30). 
 
However, an explanation for why such inaction occurred, and an estimate 
of the realistic chances of alternative tactics being successfully implemented, has 
also to take into account some other notable weaknesses of the strike compared 
with its predecessor in ’72. 
 
 
(3) weakness of rank-and-file organization and left-wing networks 
 
A fundamental characteristic of the ‘84-5 strike that distinguished it from 
‘72 was the very high degree of control exercised by the full-time officials of the 
various NUM areas and national executive. This followed a process of 
bureaucratization within pit and area level union structures which had taken place 
during the 1970s and early ‘80s. In the 1960s and early ‘70s there had been a 
counter-pressure to this trend in the important Yorkshire area in the form of a 
network of experienced left-wing activists (in the Barnsley Forum) who had the 
base of support in their own pits to encourage rank-and-file action even though 
the union leadership condemned it in the ’69 and ’70 disputes. The rank-and-
file’s subsequent success in taking control of the ’72 strike and leading it to 
victory enabled the militants to go even further, capturing a number of full-time 
posts at the pit or area level and effectively winning control of the official union 
machine in Yorkshire.. Other left areas such as Scotland and South Wales saw 
similar developments, culminating in Scargill’s subsequent elevation to 
leadership of the NUM in 1981 and the election of a solid left majority on the 
union’s national executive by 1984.  
 
Yet in many respects this left then proceeded to allow the network of grass 
roots activists that had emerged to dissolve into the bureaucratic union machine 
that existed at both pit and area level, with the Barnsley Forum ceasing to exist 
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and the Miners’ Forum essentially becoming a body for full-time union officials. 
What increasingly seemed to matter was attempting to keep on good terms with 
the area leaderships, even when this sometimes meant dampening down pit-
level struggles that flared up spontaneously (Harman, 1985). 
 
During the ’84-5 strike, whilst the left leaders of the main areas clearly 
wanted to mount a display of strength sufficient to force the government and the 
Coal Board back to the negotiating table, they were equally firmly opposed to 
replicating the tactics of the ’72 strike. And unlike ’72, the Communist Party - by 
now generally more concerned to operate through the influence of official union 
channels than to encourage rank-and-file initiative - effectively acted as a force of 
constraint throughout the strike. The CP was also wracked by its political schism 
between old-style, ‘hard-line Stalinists’ and a new ‘Euro-Communist’ wing, with 
high-level NUM figures such as Mick McGahey and George Bolton having 
ideological as well as tactical differences with Scargill (Eaden and Renton, 2002). 
A national left-wing and organized rank-and-file network within the union was 
now noticeable by its absence, either to exert pressure on those who had won 
full-time posts or to provide some direction for the enthusiasm of young militant 
miners thrown into activity by the strike. Although in the Yorkshire area a rank-
and-file network grew out of the immediate needs of activists seeking to hold the 
strike together at a local level (which included supporters of left-wing groups such 
as the Socialist Workers Party), and gained some support from the Barnsley and 
South Yorkshire panels, it was too small to have any real impact (Winterton and 
Winterton, 1989: 240-241). 
 
Moreover, despite Scargill’s leadership as one of the most militant and 
left-wing figures in British trade-union history there were limits to what he could 
achieve. This was to a large extent imposed by the reliance on operating through 
the union’s official machine and its area leaders (albeit often ‘left’ officials) rather 
than independent rank-and-file organization and activity from below. This meant 
that although union officials in key areas blocked Scargill’s picketing tactics (for 
example, at Nottingham, the power and steel plants, and at Orgreave) he made 
no attempt to break with them publicly or (apart from briefly over Orgeave) to 
appeal over their heads to encourage the most active strikers to adopt the 
militant tactics needed to win (Callinicos and Simons, 1985: 242-247). 
 
In other words, the miners won in ’72 with a right-wing union president 
(and a small right-majority on the national executive) because at the pit level 
there were activists linked together who could coordinate action even if some of 
those at the top of the union wanted to hold it back. By contrast, the miners lost 
in ‘84-5, despite incomparably more militant national leadership from the union’s 
left-wing president (and with a left-wing executive), because those independent 
rank-and-file and left-wing networks had withered away. Nonetheless, if NUM 
area officials had acted differently and attempted to call for more effective mass 
and flying picketing along the lines indicated, this in turn might have given those 
individual militants and branch officials who were keen to escalate the action to 
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make the strike more effective the confidence to organize and co-ordinate their 
activities, and pull much wider forces into such activity. 
 
Yet whatever the tactical and organizational difficulties internally within the 
NUM, these were further compounded and accentuated by external factors of an 
even greater magnitude. 
 
 
 (4) limited solidarity action 
 
Undoubtedly the most important explanation for the defeat of the 84-5 
strike was the limited solidarity - in terms of industrial action – the miners 
received from other trade-unionists compared with ’72. The success of the 
miners in ’72 (and in ’74) had been largely due to the fact that the movement of 
coal had been ‘blacked’ en masse, with the result that the lights went out fairly 
rapidly over Britain. But whilst there was considerable practical relief support 
across the country in ‘84-5 - evidenced by the network of support groups, the 
‘twinning’ of trade-union branches with individual pits, street-based financial 
collections, food donations and benefit socials - such solidarity could only sustain 
the miners for the year-long strike, whereas victory required physical industrial 
support in the form of boycotts and solidarity strikes. Yet this was not generally 
forthcoming. , (including the refusal by railway workers across the country to 
handle coal trains despite being threatened with the sack in a number of places, 
 
There were some notable exceptions. The NUR and ASLEF instructed its 
members to boycott the movement of all coal and coking coal, with the result that 
across the country railway workers refused to handle coal trains, despite bring 
threatened with the sack in a number of places (notably in Coalville, 
Leicestershire, and in the north-west). Dockers and seafarers also blocked 
imports of coal in some places, and Fleet Street Sun printers twice refused to 
print copies of the paper in protest at hostile editorial policy covering the miners 
dispute. However, there was the failure of several key unions to deliver effective 
industrial support. 
  
Arguably, the reason for the level of solidarity falling well below what was 
needed to win was primarily because of the role of the TUC general council and 
official union leadership (which included the left-led transport workers' union as 
well as the right-wing led steel and power workers’ unions), but was also 
because of the lack of confidence and strong independent rank-and-organization 
on the ground inside the British trade-union movement generally during this 
period. Three examples illustrate the first problem:  
 
• Docks: there was the refusal of the TGWU leadership to use the two national 
docks strikes to prevent BSC’s attempt to import coal through crucial non-
scheme ports at Dover through mass picketing and to call for the extension of 
the National Dock Labour Scheme to all ports (to cover the 19,000 dockers 
employed in ports outside the Scheme that were on strike). Crucially, if this 
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had been done, it would have opened up a second front alongside the miners. 
The first docks’ strike in July 1984 in particular, potentially transformed the 
miners’ situation given that (although defeated at Orgreave) with other trade-
unionists joining them out on strike they could still have won. Certainly, the 
sense of panic that had been such a feature of the industrial relations crises 
of the early 1970s was palpable, with the dock strike precipitating a drop in 
the pound and an increase in interest rates by 2 per cent (Financial Times, 16 
July 1984). Coal Board chairman Ian MacGregor (1986: 254) acknowledged 
that the widening out of the strike to the docks ‘caused a great deal of anxiety’ 
inside BSC and the government, and demonstrated the ‘tightrope we had to 
walk all the time to keep the miners’ strike from becoming a national trade-
union issue’. In the event, the hesitation and inaction of the TGWU leadership 
contributed to the strike’s collapse, as what had begun as a show of strength 
ended in failure. 
 
• TUC: there was the refusal throughout the year-long strike of the TUC general 
council (and Labour Party leadership) to translate their formal public 
declarations of support for the miners into effective solidarity industrial action 
on the ground. Thus, instead of attempting to encourage trade-unionists to 
respect miners’ picket lines, to stop ‘scab’ coal and oil entering the power 
stations (or even to support regional TUCs who held days of action in support 
of the miners), they put much of their effort into top-level shuttle-diplomacy 
aimed at securing a compromise deal and return to work. Not surprisingly 
relations between the NUM and TUC were strained (with formal assistance 
only sought after the first six months of the strike), not just because of 
longstanding suspicion and contempt for the betrayal of 1926, but also 
because of its perceived retreat in the face of Thatcherism’s offensive against 
trade-unionism. When the TUC general secretary Len Murray condemned 
violence on the picket lines ‘from whatever quarter’, and refused to mobilize 
solidarity industrial action when the NUM’s assets were sequestrated for 
contempt of court, it merely confirmed for most strikers its reputation as an 
ineffective and unreliable source of support. As a striker at Whitwell colliery in 
Derbyshire commented: ‘The TUC was absolute rubbish, a waste of time. It 
give us nothing…whatsover’ (Richards, 1996: 133). 
 
• NACODS: there was the decision by the pit deputies’ union (NACODS) 
leaders to call off its threatened national strike (against the Coal Board’s 
attempt to terminate an agreement which guaranteed their pay if they turned 
back at NUM picket lines) on the basis of a (unfulfilled) government promise 
for a new review procedure to cover pit closures. According to Ian MacGregor 
(1986: 273) a strike could have closed down the working pits in 
Nottinghamshire and ‘brought Scargill near to victory’, a prospect that led 
Thatcher to later acknowledge her fear she was ‘in danger of losing 
everything’ from a stoppage that ‘could indeed have brought down the 
government’ (Campbell, 2003: 366). 
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These three examples illustrate that lack of official union backing was 
probably one of the most fatal blows to the miners’ chances for victory. Whilst 
union leaders clearly did not want the miners to lose, they were equally 
concerned not to become involved in mobilizing their members in an open 
political confrontation with the government, which they feared would lead to the 
threat of legal action, sequestration of unions funds, and the possibility of serious 
defeat. Meanwhile, newly-elected Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock, viewing the 
party’s close association with the unions as an electoral liability, also gave 
credence to the government and media portrayal of strikers as mindless thugs 
keeping the majority of miners out by sheer intimidation, through his repeated 
condemnation of picket line violence (although he was at the same time unable 
to distance himself completely from the miners). 
 
But in addition it was much more difficult for miners to gain solidarity 
action from rank-and-file trade-unionists compared with ’72 because the strength 
of the British shop stewards’ movement had been severely undermined and 
suffered a series of setbacks in the late 1970s and early ‘80s. The government 
had successfully defeated national strikes by steelworkers in 1980 and train 
drivers in 1982, as well as outlawing trade-unions at Cheltenham GCHQ in 1984. 
It had also introduced employment legislation that reduced immunity from legal 
prosecution for certain types of strikes, secondary action and picketing (utilized at 
the Stockport Messenger dispute in 1983; Dickenson, 1984). And amidst the 
general downturn in the level of workers’ struggles, rocketing unemployment and 
shift in the balance of bargaining power to employers, there was an increasing 
pragmatic defensiveness on the shopfloor. As a result, the minority of activists 
and militants in the workplaces who might have been prepared to take industrial 
action in support of the miners often did not have the organization, experience or 
confidence to confront union officials (or even shop stewards) who failed to 
organize for real solidarity. The extent of the downturn in struggle was reflected 
in Sheffield engineering - with no major stoppages in 1981, only one in 1982 
(against redundancies) and again only one in 1983 (over redundancies) 
(Department of Employment Gazette, July 1982, July 1983 and July 1984).  
 
The ability and willingness of trade-unionists to take industrial action in 
support of the miners was also to some degree dependent on the health of 
workplace union organization, with resilient workplace organization in 
newspapers and on the docks leading to a much more positive response than 
within the road haulage industry, with little such organization, or in the steel 
industry, where it had been severely damaged after the 1980 strike. (Winterton 
and Winterton, 1989: 117). No doubt, the damaging consequences of the miners’ 
own internal divisions, with most Nottinghamshire miners working, also 
undermined the strength of the NUM’s case amongst some trade-unionists. 
 
In so far as there were any left-wing networks in the unions – which were 
anyway much weaker in numbers and influence in key sections of industry 
compared with ‘72 – their predominant broad left electoral orientation towards 
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winning positions meant they had become so absorbed by their own niches 
within the lower ranks of the official movement as to fail to carry the arguments 
down to the shopfloor. As a result, many union road haulage drivers, and steel 
and power workers, fearing for their own jobs, felt unable to take industrial action 
to assist striking miners.  
 
 
Certainly a large minority of trade-unionists in many different strategic 
industries (including railways, power, steel and transport) supported the strike, 
and were prepared to show this by donating food and money, and, in some 
cases, taking industrial action, even if this was usually of a token nature. 
Precisely because of their lack of confidence in their own ability to deliver more 
decisive action, they were liable to look to left-led union officials for a lead. As it 
was, because such leadership was not forthcoming it directly contributed, along 
with other factors we have considered, to the miners’ defeat. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In any assessment of workers’ defeat it is always difficult to evaluate the relative 
importance of objective and subjective factors in bringing it about. Undoubtedly 
the objective constraints in 1984-5 - such as the difficult economic environment, 
nature of the state’s offensive and the significant decline in the level of workers’ 
struggle and confidence generally inside the trade-union movement - meant the 
struggle was much more difficult for the miners than in 1972. But this did not 
necessarily make defeat inevitable, as many commentators have tended to 
assume. Also of major significance was the subjective factor of human agency 
and trade-union leadership - notably the militant tactics that were either not 
adopted or were insufficiently enforced, combined with the lack of effective 
solidarity industrial action.  
 
Of course, the adoption of any single one of the alternative tactical 
initiatives or courses of action that have been outlined above is unlikely to have 
had enough impact to have significantly altered the outcome of the strike in itself, 
although it might have acted to set off a chain reaction which brought into play 
other steps that combined together might have made a real difference.  
 
Undoubtedly some of the missing tactical steps would have been easier to 
achieve than others - particularly given that the high level of optimism that ‘the 
world could be changed’ characteristic of the ’72 strike had been considerably 
eroded by ‘84-5. For example, it seems likely an escalation of the mass picketing 
by the miners aimed at stopping the movement of coal into steel plants would 
have been less demanding to achieve than solidarity action by steel workers 
themselves. In the case of the former the miners were fighting for their own jobs, 
held a strong belief in the justice of their case, and the momentum of the strike 
had itself generated a relatively high level of confidence that Thatcher could be 
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defeated, at least amongst the active minority of strikers. By contrast, in the case 
of the latter the steel workers had just been defeated in their own strike, were 
less willing to engage in action that might threaten their own jobs, and were much 
more affected by the general air of fatalism and retreat that characterised 
sections of the trade-union movement.  
 
However, even if solidarity action by steel workers was more difficult to 
achieve than an escalation of the mass picketing by miners outside the steel 
plants, this does not mean that if the latter had been adopted it might not have 
helped to transform the climate sufficiently to make the former much more 
realistically achievable, at least in some steel plants.  
 
Whether the eventual outcome of the strike even if a series of alternative 
tactical initiatives by the miners combined with solidarity action from other 
workers had been taken, given the enormous objective constraints, would have 
been a miners’ victory is impossible to know, although it is a legitimate question 
to pose. Even so, the other side of the coin to take into account, albeit beyond 
the terms of this particular article, is another consideration: What alternative 
stratagems might both capital and the state have adopted in counter-response to 
such more militant tactics and could they have diminished their overall impact? 
 
Much more speculative and hypothetical would be any attempt to answer 
the following questions: If there had been a miners’ victory would the 
Conservative government have been in office for another 12 years, would New 
Labour have still emerged and taken the same form, and would the trade-union 
movement have continued to suffer such a high loss in membership, 
organizational strength and morale? Conversely, even if there had been a 
miners’ victory would not the Conservative government have returned to the fray 
at a latter stage, either in another outright confrontation or by overseeing a drip-
by-drip reduction in pits and jobs that threatened the long-term survival of the 
mining industry on a rather more gradual but no less dramatic basis?  
 
No doubt some people will dispute the validity of even the approach 
adopted here  - with reference to the ‘84-5 miners’ strike or any other historical 
event - on the basis that it is a pointless exercise; what happened in the past 
happened and no amount of alternative contemplation will change that or is 
worthwhile. But arguably the historical re-evaluation presented here of what was 
one of the most important British industrial disputes of the 20th century has 
demonstrated the methodological legitimacy and value of the exercise, not least 
because inquiring into what might have happened helps to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of what actually happened.   
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